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Abstract
In this paper, we implement a recently developed econometric model,
the Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR), to investigate the dynamic effects
of government spending on key macroeconomic variables. In line with
existing literature, we find that a government spending shock has positive
effects on consumption and output. By splitting the sample in a pre-
and post- Volcker period, we find that the positive effects of government
spending on consumption and output over the whole sample are largely
due to the first part of the sample.
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the subprime crisis, there has been a heated debate in the
United States about whether the Government should engage in a fiscal stimulus
or not. The main argument supporting a fiscal stimulus is that since private
demand has collapsed, public demand has to take over. This argument gains a
lot more traction if we consider the fact that there was no room for monetary
policy intervention since the Fed Funds rate had already hit the “zero lower
bound”. The Government typically has two means at its disposal to achieve a
fiscal stimulus: either it lowers taxes, either it increases spending. A traditional
keynesian economist would suggest an increase in public spending in order to
boost demand. This will only work if the implied multiplier on real GDP is
higher than 1. The idea is that the increase in demand will induce firms to
anticipate more demand, thus investing more, which will, in turn, increase the
output. Employment will also rise, which will further boost demand. In fact,
the keynesian multiplier relies on a virtuous circle. On the other hand, the neo-
classical economist would suggest neither, since both the increase in government
spending as well as the reduction in the tax rates will imply higher taxes in the
future. This induces a negative wealth effect for the agents, which will offset
the initial effect coming from the fiscal stimulus. In this case, Ricardian equiv-
alence holds and the fiscal stimulus has not the same effects: the government
spending multiplier for consumption is negative for standard assumptions; the
government spending multiplier for output is typically less than one. Depend-
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ing on the assumptions (about preferences, stance of monetary policy etc.), the
government spending multiplier for output can be greater or smaller than one.
To get a positive effect on consumption, we need specific assumption such as
the presence of “Rule of Thumb consumers” as in Galí et al. (2004).
Now when the government official has to take his decision, he cannot rely
solely on theoretical predictions. What he really needs is empirical estimations
of the effects this policy might incur. Similarly to the recent events, this has
been a problem after the “Internet Bubble” bursted. The same questions came
up, and when the government looked for empirical estimation of the effects of
fiscal policies, there was none. In fact, this is a subject that has not been much
explored since the collapse of the keynesian theory in the late 70’s. Following the
Lucas critique, the only stabilization policy that spurred interest was monetary
policy. The first recent paper to investigate such questions is Blanchard &
Perotti (2002). In this paper, they estimate a VAR model with taxes, public
spending and GDP. They achieve identification by using institutionnal data
for the short-run transmission of fiscal policies (imposing short-run restrictions
coming from lags of implementation for example). They find results that comfort
old keynesian theories, namely a positive multiplier on consumption and output,
but a crowding-out effect on investment. Since then, other papers —surveyed
by Perotti (2007)—have been written to investigate the fiscal policy multipliers
and thus compare neoclassical and new keynesian theories by focusing on wage
and labour supply in addition.
Two methods have been employed to estimate the effects of a fiscal policy
shock. The first one consists in generating a dummy for each exogeneous and
unforeseen public spending build-up (typically the Korean War, the Vietnam
war and the Carter-Reagan build-up). It has been pioneered by Ramey &
Shapiro (1998). By analysing the effects of changing the dummy from zero to
one, they find that consumption decreases on impact. This provides support for
the neoclassical theory. The second one makes use of restrictions relating the
structural shocks to the matrix of the innovations. This is the method used by
Blanchard & Perotti (2002). In this line of work, we can also mention Perotti
(2005). In this paper, he analyses the effects of fiscal shocks on macroeconomic
variables in OECD countries. The main results are that there is no evidence
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that tax shocks work better than spending shocks and that the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal policy have tended to fade away in the post-1979 period when
compared to the pre-1979 one (yielding even negative responses for GDP and
investment to a spending shock). The method of shock identification is the same
as in Blanchard & Perotti (2002). Others papers have used this method, but
identifying the structural shocks in an other way. In Fatás & Mihov (2001),
they estimate a semi-structural VAR, which means that they only identify the
structural shocks on spending, leaving aside its relationship with innovations
for taxes and the other variables of the VAR. This is done using a standard
Cholesky decomposition. They find that fiscal policy shocks induce strong and
persistent increases in consumption and employment. Another route has been
taken by Mountford & Uhlig (2009) to identify the structural shocks. In this
paper, they consider sign restrictions; this amounts to imposing, for example,
that the monetary policy shock has a positive effect on the 3-Month T-Bill
rate (to distinguish it from monetary policy shock), on government and Federal
expenditure etc.. Comparing three different scenarios for the fiscal shock, they
find that deficit-financed tax cut is the most effective one.
Those methods are nevertheless subject to some pitfalls. For example, as
pointed in Fatás & Mihov (2001) and Perotti (2007), the fiscal policy shock
can be anticipated. If this is the case, the identification of the structural fiscal
policy shock is likely to be contaminated1. Furthermore, those studies share
the unavoidable default of the VAR approach, which imposes a limited amount
of variables in the autoregressive vector. In fact, the number of coefficient to
estimate is proportional to n2 for a vector containing n variables. This renders
the estimation of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on more than 6 or 7 variables
hazardous since we cannot estimate the underlying coefficients with enough
precision . Finally, if we want to track the effects of fiscal policy shocks on say,
output, we cannot be sure that this variable will be perfectly measured by GDP.
In this paper, we will try to overcome those pitfalls using an empirical
1In fact, as it is shown in Forni & Gambetti (2010), when we consider contemporaneous
forecast of government spending, the estimated government spending shock obtained using
identification à la Blanchard & Perotti (2002) is not orthogonal to those forecasts. This means
that the government spending shock can be predicted. It cannot then be considered as a true
strucural shock
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technique thas has been developed by Bernanke et al. (2005), namely Factor-
Augmented VAR. This builds on the method of static factor models devel-
opped by Chamberlain & Rothschild (1983) and Chamberlain (1983). In this
framework, if we think of the variables Xit as answers from an ability test,
i ∈ {1 . . . N} will be the number of the question and t ∈ {1 . . . T} will be the
individual taking the test. Those variables are composed of two components
: the common factors (reading ability, writing ability etc.) and the idiosyn-
cratic component, which can be correlated accross individuals. This has been
extended to the dynamic framework —i.e where Xit will represent the macroe-
conomic aggregate i at time t—by Forni et al. (2000), Forni et al. (2009), Stock
& Watson (2002), Stock & Watson (2005) and Bai & Ng (2002). Here, the
assumption for the idiosyncratic errors is that the variance-covariance matrix
will not be diagonal. The basic idea is to exploit a large set of data (i.e with
large T and large N) and extract latent factors that are assumed to drive the
dynamic co-movments of the series. Formally, this is done by extracting fac-
tors (by Principal Component Analysis, or by Maximum Likelihood through the
Kalman Filter) and keeping those which explain the main part of the variance
in the dataset. When combined with VAR analysis, this gives the Bernanke
et al. (2005) Factor-Augmented (FAVAR) method. This method has many ad-
vantages over the “simple” VAR one. First of all, it permits to treat more
information, without having to estimate a great number of coefficients. Then,
it allows for the computation of the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the
variables that are not explicitely in the autoregressive vector through the fac-
tor loadings. Instead of focusing on GDP, we can extract latent factors from a
dataset containing variables for real activity (capacity utilization, output gap,
GDP etc.) and treat it as a generated regressor. Finally, since the VAR model
is nested in the FAVAR one, it is possible to assess the marginal contribution
of the estimated factors by comparing the decomposition of the forecast error
variances.
The use of this technique can be further motivated by taking into account
the problem of fundamentalness. This latter echoes the one of predictability of
the estimated structural fiscal policy shocks. If the estimated shock is predicted,
then the MA representation of the VAR might not be fundamental. Mathemat-
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ically, this means that the modulus of the roots of the polynomial MA matrix
determinant lie inside the unit circle. This implies that the variables do not have
a VAR representation in the structural shocks, which renders the VAR approach
not suited since it does not treat enough information. Some techniques have
been used to deal with this issue, among which the use of Blaschke matrices
and the structural factor method. In fact, because it consists in a tall system,
the structural factor approach is immune to the fundamentalness problem. We
will return to this issue later in section 2. This motivates further the use of
structural factor (and thus, FAVAR) to analyse the multipliers of fiscal policy.
This has recently been done by Forni & Gambetti (2010). In this paper, they
estimate a structural factor model using identification restriction à la Mount-
ford & Uhlig (2009). They find positive multpliers on consumption, output,
investment and hours and a negative one on real wages.
In this paper, I want to address a question they do not document, namely
the evolution over time of the fiscal policy multipliers. As we have already seen,
this problem has been documented in the SVAR litterature by Perotti (2005).
According to this literature, the effects of fiscal policy have tended to fade away
across time, mainly after the Volcker turning point. This is consistent with this
period being labelled as the “Great Moderation”. This question has been further
documented by Bilbiie et al. (2008), but again using a SVAR approach. In addi-
tion, they provide an explanation based on Limited Asset Market Participation
(Bilbiie (2008)).The argument is that monetary policy switched from passive
to active and that the tremendous development of financial markets enabled a
growing part of the population to smooth consumption. In fact, drawing on
Galí et al. (2004), the portion of consumers who do not have access to financial
market (“Rule of Thumb” consumers) merely consume their real wages. With
less people exhibiting this kind of behavior, the effects of fiscal policy shocks
are predicted to have a reduced impact on the main macroeconomic variables.
As pointed in Perotti (2005), VAR analysis has been only recently (begin-
ning at the end of the 20st century) applied to the study of fiscal policy shocks.
The VAR method was mainly used to study questions pertaining to the effects
of monetary policy (see Sims & Zha (1998), Cochrane (1998)). After the Blan-
chard & Perotti (2002) paper has been published, a lot of papers using VAR
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on fiscal policy matters have been published. The same pattern seems to hold
for the use of the FAVAR method. It has mainly been used for the study of
monetary policy (see Bernanke et al. (2005), Boivin et al. (2009) and Boivin
et al. (2010)). As far as I know, the only two papers that studies fiscal policy
shocks in a dynamic factor model framework are, for the first one Benassy-
Quere & Cimadomo (2006) —but they only consider a Factor-Augmented VAR
for european countries, not for the US; they also use an identification scheme
à la Blanchard & Perotti (2002), which is not fully consistent with fiscal fore-
sight, as argued by Forni & Gambetti (2010). The second one being Forni &
Gambetti (2010), which estimates probability densities for the IRFs following
Mountford & Uhlig (2009); this allows them to implement sign restrictions on
the IRFs. I will use a FAVAR model à la Bernanke et al. (2005) and identify
government spending shocks by ordering government spending first through a
standard Cholesky ordering procedure. My objective is to document further
the dynamic effects of government spending, and to see if those effects have
been fading away after the Volcker turning point. The more straightforward
way to do it is to split the sample in two periods : the pre-Volcker one and the
Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke one as in Bilbiie (2008) and Perotti (2005).
The paper will be organized as follows : section 2 will present the FAVAR
model and the motivations for using it to study the dynamic effects of gov-
ernment spending. Section 3 will describe the data used and the identification
procedure in comparison with the ones that have been implemented in the fis-
cal SVAR literature. Section 4 deals with the empirical results using SVAR
and FAVAR method in the whole sample, then on the two subsamples. Sec-
tion 5 concludes. The Impule Response Functions and the tests results for the
statistical properties of the data used are in the Appendix.
2 Fundamentalness and the FAVAR Model
2.1 A refresher on fundamentalness
Among the several advantages of using FAVAR techniques instead of classic
SVAR ones, I will lay emphasis on the question of fundamentalness. In fact,
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when we deal with fiscal policy, agents receive clear signals about future policies.
This can be due to implementation (it takes time for fiscal measures to come into
effect once decided) as well as legislative (fiscal policy reacts slowly to economic
conditions) lags. In their paper, Leeper et al. (2008) focus on the econometric
implications of fiscal foresight. When this is the case, the econometrician will
treat as news old information, which rational agents have already taken into
account in their decisions. They also show that, in general, this induces time
series with non-invertible MA process. Let us consider the following process :
Xt = Φ(L)εt (1)
where L is the lag operator (i.e. such that LXt = Xt−1), Xt is a (N × 1)
vector of observable variables, εt is a (q × 1) vector of structural shocks and
Φ(L) is a (N × q) lag polynomial. This says that Xt lies on the space spanned
by {εt−k, k ≥ 0}. But the converse (i.e that εt lies on the space spanned by
{Xt−k, k ≥ 0}) does not necessarily hold. This will be true only under certain
conditions for Φ(L). For the sake of simplicity, let us first assume that N > q,
and that Φ(L) = I−AL. We now have Xt = (I−AL)εt, which will be invertible
only if the following three conditions are satisfied :
1. εt is a weak white noise vector
2. Φ(z) has no poles inside the unit circle
3. det Φ(z) has all its roots lying outside the unit circle
In this case, we can rewrite equation (1) as :
∞∑
i=0
AiXt−i = εt
From this we see that we only need past values of Xt to identify the structural
shocks. This comes from the fact that Φ(z)−1 contains only positive powers of
z. If there was one z ∈ C such that |z| = 1 and det Φ(z) = 0, Φ(z) would
not be invertible. If one of the three conditions are violated for |z| 6= 1, we
would need future values of Xt to identify the structural shocks. This poses a
problem to identify contemporaneous structural shocks. The structural shocks
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we want to estimate are called this way because they are assumed to drive the
economy. They are observed by the economic agents and do not necessarily
correspond to the innovations resulting from the estimation of equation (1). In
case the lag polynomial is invertible but does not satisfy the preceding three
conditions, {Xt−k, k ≥ 0} ⊂ {εt−k, k ≥ 0} and the information set of the
econometrician is smaller than the agent’s one. In this case, the innovations we
get after estimation will not correspond to the structural shocks and εt will then
be labelled Xt-nonfundamental. If conversely the lag polynomial verifies the
three conditions, then the estimated innovations will be the structural shocks
and will be labelled Xt-fundamental. We have supposed that N > q in this
example. We can also recover the structural shocks under certain conditions
if N = q, but it can be shown (see Alessi et al. (2008) and Forni & Gambetti
(2010)) that those conditions are more stringent in this case. Therefore, non-
fundamentalness will be a generic problem in the N = q case, but not in the
N > q, “tall system” one. We will now present the FAVAR model, which builds
on one of those “tall systems” that enables to get rid of the fundamentalness
problem, the dynamic factor model.
2.2 The FAVAR model
As we have seen, the main caveat of the VAR approach is that it doesn’t allow
for the econometrician to treat enough information. One way to do this in a
parsimonious way is to sum up the information contained in a large dataset
through a subset of latent, unobserved factors. Denote by Xt the (N×1) vector
of observable variables. Now we suppose that the comovements of the variables
in this data set depend on r common factors. Formally, this gives :
Xt = Λft + ξt (2)
where Λ is a (N × r) matrix of factor loadings and the ξt’s are idiosyncratic
errors2. The approximate dynamic factor framework relies on the assumption
2Idiosyncratic errors can in some cases be interpretated as measurement errors. This
interpretation is reasonable when we deal with purely “macro” variables such as GDP. When
we consider sectoral variables, ξt can be interpreted as a sector-specific shock. See Forni &
Gambetti (2010)
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that the ξt are assumed to be mildly cross-section correlated and are uncorelated
at all leads and lags with the factor loadings. Since the idisyncratic errors are
only poorly cross-correlated, if we take an appropriate linear combination of
the variables, they will vanish asymptotically. This is the Principal Component
method. If we denote by ΣˆX the empirical variance-covariance matrix of Xt,
then it can be decomposed as Pˆ DˆPˆ−1, with Dˆ the diagonal matrix containing
the eigenvalues and Pˆ the matrix of the associated eigenvectors. If we denote
by λi the ith eigenvalue of ΣˆX (which are sorted in decreasing order), we choose
r such that λr  λr+1. We can then approximate ΣˆX by Pˆ1Dˆ1Pˆ1−1, where
Pˆ1 is composed of the r eigenvectors corresponding to the r largest eigenvalues.
From (2) we see that the factors cannot be directly identified. In fact, if we
take any Q matrix such that QQ′ = I, then Λ˜f˜t, with Λ˜ = ΛQ and f˜t = Q′ft is
observationaly equivalent to Λft. The factors are thus unique up to a rotation
matrix. We must then impose normalization assumptions. Following Bai & Ng
(2002), we impose 1T
∑T
t=1 FˆtFˆ
′
t = Ir. This implies that the factor loadings and
the latent factors write, respectively, Pˆ Dˆ1/2 and Dˆ−1/2Pˆ ′Xt.
Having an estimate of the latent factors, we can now treat them, in a second
step, as generated regressors. We will estimate a VAR augmented with the
estimated factors. Yt
fˆt
 =
Φ11(L) Φ12(L)
Φ21(L) Φ22(L)
Yt−1
fˆt−1
+ νt (3)
This method has been shown to be valid by Bai & Ng (2006). In fact, if
√
T/N →
0 as N,T → ∞, then the sampling uncertainty from tirst step estimation is
negligible and standard errors for the estimates of the factor loadings can be
computed as if the true ft have been used in the VAR. Here, Yt contains variables
we are especially interested in and the νt = (ν1t ν2t ν3t)′ are linear combinations
of the structural shocks. The Yt are typically, as in Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
output, taxes and government expenses.
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3 Data and Identification procedure
3.1 Identification in the Fiscal SVAR literature
As we have already said, most of the literature focusing on the dynamic effects
of fiscal policy shocks has relied on shocks identified through a structural VAR
modelisation. We will suppose, as it is implicitely done in the SVAR literature,
that the factors do not play any role. This amouns to say that Φ12(L) = 0.
Therefore, equation (3) boils down to :

Y1t
Y2t
Y3t
 = Φ11(L)

Y1t−1
Y2t−1
Y3t−1
+

1t
2t
3t
 (4)
An important feature of this VAR specification is that the innovation terms
t are mutually correlated. Therefore, we cannot say that a shock to 1t is a
shock specific to the variable Y1. What we want is to recover the shocks that
are specific to one variable and are assumed to drive the economy. Those will
be labelled the structural shocks, and the innovations can be viewed as a linear
combinations of them. 
1t
2t
3t
 =

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33


u1t
u2t
u3t
 (5)
For the model equations to be identifiable, we need to impose 3(3−1)2 = 3
restrictions on the matrix relating innovations to structural shocks. This is
the approach taken by Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005) and Fatás
& Mihov (2001). I will first develop the method of the latter one. Following
Hamilton (1994, pp.320-323), the expression of the innovation in function of
the structural shocks can be obtained by the observation that the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is symetric; it can then be
written as Ω = PDP ′. Taking P˜ = PD1/2, we can write Ω = P˜ P˜ ′. We can now
construct the ut = [u1t u2t u3t]
′ as P˜−1t. The key is that P˜ will be a lower
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triangular matrix of the following form :
1t
2t
3t
 =

√
V ar(u1t) 0 0
a21
√
V ar(u2t) 0
a31 a32
√
V ar(u3t)


u1t
u2t
u3t

Therefore, the inovation of the first variable in the VAR will be the structural
shock of this variable multiplied by its standard deviation. This is the Cholesky
decomposition. In their paper, Fatás & Mihov (2001) use this method and
place the fiscal spending variable first. This specification implies that there is
no contemporaneous correlation between the fiscal spending variable and the
other ones in the model; which means that fiscal spending does not react within
the quarter to other variables, i.e to macroeconomic activity. This method is
valid only because they are interested in identifying one structural shock, the
fiscal spending one. If we want to compare spending and taxes shocks, this
method would not be appropriate.
This is what Blanchard & Perotti (2002) want to do. To cope with this
issue, they use out of model data to estimate the aij coefficients. In their
specification, these can be interpreted as elasticities of structural shocks with
respect to innovations. Taking Y1t = Gt, Y2t = Tt and Y3t = Yt —where Gt are
Government expenses, Tt are net taxes and Yt is GDP —we have :
gt = a11u
y
t + a12utt + u
g
t
tt = a21u
y
t + a22utt + utt
yt = a31u
g
t + a32utt + u
y
t
From this, according to Blanchard & Perotti (2002), we see that the reduced
form residual of the Government spending equation depends on the automatic
and discretionary response of fiscal policy to unexpected changes in output, both
of which are captured by the a11 term. It also depends on random discretionary
shocks to fiscal policies, which are captured by the structural shock ugt . If we
assume that discretionary fiscal policy doesn’t react within a quarter to output
shocks, then a11 capture only the automatic response of fiscal policy, which can
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be estimated using institutional data. The authors then construct a transformed
fiscal spending innovation by substracting the output shock weighted by its
estimated coefficient. Doing the same for taxes, both fiscal policy innovations
can be exprimed as a linear combinations of the two fiscal policy structural
shocks :
gt − a11uyt = g,CAt = a12utt + ugt
tt − a21uyt = t,CAt = a22utt + utt
where CA stands for Cyclically Adjusted. Finally, putting the fiscal spend-
ing or tax shock first amounts to a reduced Cholesky ordering, and since the
correlation between the two cycliccaly adjusted fiscal shocks is low, the order
does not matter much. The method employed in Perotti (2005) is the same,
with inflation and interest rates added into the autoregressive vector.
For the sake of simplicity, we will take Fatás & Mihov (2001) approach, i.e
ordering the government spending variable first. The main reason for this choice
is that we want to focus on one specific shock, the government spending one. In
this case, the government spending shock will simply be the residual from the
government spending equation.
3.2 Data
We use two kinds of data. First of all, we need a large dataset from which the
factors will be estimated. To this end, we use Ludvigson & Ng (2009) data. This
dataset is an extension of the one used in Stock & Watson (2005). It consists
of 131 monthly macroeconomic time series spanning the period 1964:1-2007:12.
They can be partionned in 8 different groups of variables (output and income;
labor market; housing; consumption, orders and inventories; money and credit;
bond and exchange rates; prices; stock market). From this dataset, the authors
extract 8 latent factors, which we will use for our Factor Augmented VAR. All
the variables in the dataset have been previously stationarized, so the factors
12
will be stationnary.3
The variables included in the VAR will be quarterly. Therefore, before us-
ing the factors we will temporally aggregate them to get quarterly ones. The
variables in the VAR all come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis
FRED2 database. For real government spending (henceforth Gt), we use Gov-
ernment Current Expenditures (mnemonic in FRED2 : GEXPND) divided by
the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator (henceforth pit, mnemonic :
GDPDEF). For output we use Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal (hence-
forth Yt, mnemonic : GDPC1). For real consumption we use Real Personal
Consumption Expenditures, (henceforth Ct, mnemonic : PCECC96). For in-
vestment we use Gross Private Domestic Investment (henceforth It, mnemonic
: GPDIC1). Finally, we use the monthly 3 month Treasury Bill interest rate
(henceforth it, mnemonic T3BMS). All variables will be included in the VAR
and FAVAR as a log of real (deflated by the GDP deflator when the initial data
is in nominal terms), per capita variable.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 A Fiscal SVAR
We begin first by documenting further the literature on fiscal policy SVAR by
considering the dynamic effects of government spending through a Cholesky
ordering as in Fatás & Mihov (2001). Our objective here is to replicate their
results. As in this paper, all variables will be taken in logs, except for the 3
month Treasury Bill rate. The model estimated here will be of the form :
Xt = C +A(L)Xt−1 + t
with Xt = (Gt Ct Yt It pit it)′, C being a constant term. Based on the different
information criteria (Akaike, Hannan-Quin and Bayesian ones) computed, we
choose to include 3 lags in the VAR. We will now study the effects of a one
standard deviation increase in government consumption on different variables.
3By doing this a part of information is lost, because most of macroeconomic time series are
integrated of order 1. An extension of this paper will be to take into account such dynamics
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The results we find are consistent with what is typically reported in previous
studies, among which Fatás & Mihov (2001). We first note a positive effect of
government spending on consumption and output (see Figure 2). The bands
around the IRF represent asymptotic 95% confidence bands. Therefore we can
say that the effect on consumption is significantly positive for quarters going
from 0 to 18. For the effect on output, it is significant only after 8 quarters.
Both effects become non significant in the long run. There is no significant effect
on investment since the y = 0 line is always within the confidence bands. This
is in contrast with the results of by Blanchard & Perotti (2002), who find a
crowding-out effect on investment. This is also in contrast with Fatás & Mihov
(2001), who find a slightly positive effect on investment. The first comment we
can make so far is that the rise in GDP following an increase in government
spending is mainly due to the rise in consumption.
We also find that both the GDP deflator and the 3-month Treasury Bill
interest rates significantly decrease after a one standard deviation shock on gov-
ernment spending. For the interest rate the mechanism should be the following
: the government spending shock pushes up the supply of Treasury Bonds, thus
driving down its prices. The decreasing prices translate in increasing interest
rates. Therefore, the effect we get is unexpected. For the GDP deflator, the
slight decrease is also puzzling. In fact, we do not see why an increase in govern-
ment spending would push down the prices. If anything, with current expenses
of the government rising, the prices should go up. The shape of the response is
very similar to the one reported in Fatás & Mihov (2001).
Overall, those results tend to support the results of some neo-keynesian
models (among which Galí et al. (2004)) which predict a rise in consumption
after a rise in government spending. Since most neoclassical models predict a
decrease of consumption following a rise in government spending, the empirical
results contradicts the theoretical ones.
In the Fatás & Mihov (2001) paper, there is no clear reference to the statis-
tical properties of the series which are included in the SVAR. In fact, they do no
control for it by including a linear trend or differencing the data. This can pose
some problems for the computation of the IRF confidence intervals. By looking
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at the graph of the series, we know that they are trending. It remains however
to study the nature of this trend. Are the series Difference stationary or Trend
stationary? To answer this question, we run a battery of tests to check for the
presence of unit roots in the series. To choose the number of lags to include in
the test, we again use the information criteria along with Likelihood Ratio tests.
The results of the tests (reported in the appendix) do not speak clearly in favor
of the presence of unit roots in the data, at least at the 5% level4. Therefore,
following Perotti (2005), we estimate again our model with a linear time trend
in addition5.
Xt = C +A(L)Xt−1 +D ∗ t+ t
where t is an exogenous variable here. While the positive effect of a government
spending shock on consumption remains, we observe that the one on output
vanihes (it is only significantly different from zero with 90% confidence intervals,
see Figure 3) . As we will see later, this is largely due to the contrary sign of
the effects of government spending on output in the two sub-samples. Since we
are not sure that this specification is the good one, we also estimate a VAR in
first-differences. We also find a significantly positive effect on consumption, and
a positive (but non 95% significant) effect on GDP (see Figure 4). The problem
with this specification is that we loose a part of information by differencing the
data. Furthermore, if there are indeed cointegration relationship between the
variables, the model in first differences is ill specified. We will now see how
the addition of the factors helps us treating more information and how this
translates in the IRFs.
4.2 The Factor-Augmented VAR
As we have already seen, the problem with the typical SVAR is that it can treat
a limited amount of information. Therefore, we fear that the government spend-
ing shock will not be properly identified, since it can be anticipated. To deal
with this issue, Fatás & Mihov (2001) include forecast of government spending
4That is, for Gt, GDP and its components. The 3 Month T-Bill is stationary once differ-
enced and ∆log(GDPDEFt), the inflation rate, is also stationary once differenced.
5In Blanchard & Perotti (2002) they try two specifications : one with linear and quadratic
trends and variables in log of levels, one with differenced data. In Perotti (2007), they try the
same specifications, but they get rid of the quadratic trend in the first one.
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into the VAR. We take another route here, including factors as generated regres-
sors. For the sake of parsimony, we only include the first two factors estimated
by Ludvigson & Ng (2009). Together, they account for 25% of the variance
in the large dataset. By running regressions of each variable on the factors,
Ludvigson & Ng (2009) show that the first factor is more related to output,
employment, housing and orders. The second one is more related to money,
credit and financial variables. Since the two factors are stationnary, it would
not make any sense to estimate the FAVAR with the quarterly variables in log
of levels. We thus differentiate all the variables in the VAR. The information
criterion suggest 1 or 2 lags. We report the results with two lags. The results
using only one lag are very similar. The first question we can ask is : are the
factors relevant? We can answer this partially by looking at the p-values of the
factors one and two in the equations for our quarterly variables. By looking at
table 1, we can see that the factors are significantly different from zero most of
the time6. Our initial intuition is thus justified : including the factors enables
us to treat additional and relevant information.
We will now analyse the effects of a government spending shock within this
framework. The various information criteria gives us a lag order between 1 or 3.
We will retain the average number of two lags (results do not change by much
by taking one or three lags). The first issue is the place of the factors. Should
we place them just after the Gt equation? Or in the last position ? If we place
them in the last position, this implies that the innovations for the two factors
will depend on the structural shocks of all the other variables. Since the factors
represent the state of the economy, this might be a reasonable specification. On
the contrary, if we place them just after the government spending equation, this
means that the innovations of the factors are only affected by the government
spending strucutral shock and their own structural shock. We try both specifi-
cations and report here the results for the case when the factors are placed in
the last position. As it turns out, results do not vary much across specifications.
6Where ∗ stands for significant at the 5% treshold, ∗∗ for significant at the 1% treshold.
L is the lag operator and thus L2 stands for L2. Results are only reported for the first four
equations for the sake of space saving. Results are similar for the last two equations and are
reported in the appendix (see Table 4).
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Table 1: Estimation results1 : FAVAR
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Government spending
L.factor1 0.003
(0.002)
L2.factor1 0.000
(0.002)
L.factor2 0.001
(0.002)
L2.factor2 -0.004∗
(0.002)
Equation 2 : Consumption
L.factor1 -0.003∗
(0.001)
L2.factor1 0.000
(0.001)
L.factor2 0.006∗∗
(0.001)
L2.factor2 -0.002∗
(0.001)
Equation 3 : Investment
L.factor1 -0.032∗∗
(0.006)
L2.factor1 0.014∗
(0.006)
L.factor2 0.005
(0.006)
L2.factor2 0.012∗
(0.006)
Equation 4 : GDP
L.factor1 -0.006∗∗
(0.001)
L2.factor1 0.000
(0.001)
L.factor2 0.004∗∗
(0.001)
L2.factor2 0.000
(0.001)
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As with the SVAR, there is no significant response of investment to a gov-
ernment spending shock (see Figure 5). However, other SVAR results do not
hold here. While the rise in consumption is common to both specifications, the
rise in GDP is not. With our FAVAR, we observe a significantly different from
zero rise in GDP. The message for fiscal policy would then be that the rise in
consumption and output from an increase in government spending will be pos-
itive, but temporary (rapidly returning to zero impact). For the interest rates,
government spending shocks have not much effect.
4.3 How have the effects of government spending evolved
through time?
As we have already noted, there is empirical evidence supporting the diminish-
ing effect of fiscal policy after the end of the 1970’s. This provides support for
the “Great Moderation” label that has been associated with this period. Our
objective here is to document further this issue and possibly to shed new light
with the FAVAR framework. Even though the tests gave no clear cut results
about the underlying process for our series, we will consider the first-difference
VAR as our baseline specification since its results are more comparable to the
FAVAR ones. In fact, as it is commonly done in the literature, all variables in
the FAVAR will be transformed to induce stationarity. For the sake of brevity,
we will only focus on the effects of government spending on GDP and its com-
ponents. As before, we will begin by first documenting the empirical evidence
on this issue with the fiscal SVAR augmented with a linear time trend.
The response of consumption in the first part of the sample is significantly
positive, while in the second part of the sample, it is not different from 0 (see
Figure 6). As for the response of investment, it is slightly negative on impact
in the first part of the sample. In the second part, the decrease of investment
following a government spending shock is more marked (Figure 7). This echoes
to the “crowding out effect” found by Blanchard & Perotti (2002). The response
of output is only significantly positive for the first part of the sample if we
consider 90% confidence bands. We are forced to retain the same confidence
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interval for the same analysis with the SVAR in differences because the loss in
information is even more pronounced if we estimate on a smaller sample. With
this in mind, the only signifiicant result is the rise in consumption following a
government spending shock in the first part of the sample (Figure 8). To sum up,
both specifications seem to imply that the dynamic effects of fiscal policy have
tended to fade away in the second part of the sample. The first specification even
exhibits a strong crowding-out effect of government spending on investment. We
will now try to respond to the same questions, but this time using our FAVAR
framework. Since we split the sample in two, we cannot estimate exactly the
VAR in differences augmented with factors, as the dimension of the VAR will
be too high in relation to the time dimension (64 observations for the first part
of the sample and 113 for the second). Therefore, we will estimate a VAR in
differences without the inflation and interest rate, which will be replaced by the
first three factors. The motive for adding the third factor is that it will proxy
for the missing information contained in the interest and inflation rate, since it
is largely correlated with the price series in the dataset used by Ludvigson &
Ng (2009).
While the effect on GDP and consumption is still positive (Figures 10 and
11), the only response that is significantly different from zero at the 95% treshold
is the one for consumption for the first part of the sample. As for the second
part of the sample, the response is never negative, but is more close to zero
impact instead. While the fiscal SVAR (with linear trend) estimates that fiscal
policy through government spending has had a negative effect in the second
part of the sample, our FAVAR model estimates that this kind of policy has
had, instead, no clear-cut effect on GDP and its components. This is in line
with the results obtained with the VAR estimated in differences. We can try to
explain those results by looking at the shape of the IRF of government spending
to a government spending shock across the two sub samples. By looking at
Figure (1), we see that the rise in government spending following a government
spending shock is more pronounced in the first part of the sample. It is more
protracted in the second part of the sample and better estimated (the confidence
band intervals are narrower) because we have more data for this subsample.
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1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 1: Effects of government spending shock on consumption : VAR in levels
with linear trend
5 Conclusion
Our initial objective was to study the dynamic effects of government spending
using the FAVAR framework. Our results confirm largely what has already been
documented in the literature. The government spending shock has a positive
effect on consumption and output (only in the FAVAR and the SVAR without
linear trend for output), which is largely due to the first part of the sample.
Therefore, government spending shocks have had a decreasing effect on key
macroeconomic variables over the last few decades. There is nevertheless room
to make substantial improvements to our work. First of all, we were not able
to gather data on taxes. While we are able to control for a monetary policy
shock by including inflation and interest rates in the VAR, we cannot control
for a shock on taxes. Furthermore, due to the trending nature of our variables
(even though the nature of this trend is not known for sure), we must estimate
a FAVAR model in first differences since the factors have been estimated on
stationary data. Thus, the gain in information from the inclusion of the factors
comes after a loss of information due to first differencing the data; this implies
that the beneficial role of adding the factors into the VAR is not clear cut.
One solution to this problem would be to estimate I(1) factors on a large
data set and estimating a Factor Augmented Error Correction Model, as in
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Banerjee et al. (2010). This will surely minimize the loss of formation we have
experienced here. To check that the estimated government spending shock is
not anticipated, we can carry out an orthogonality test as in Forni & Gambetti
(2010) : if the estimated shock is orthogonal to the Survey of Professional
Forecasters Government spending forecast, then we can say that the government
spending shock is a truly structural shock. As for the inclusion of taxes, I will
have to consider another identification scheme for the shocks, since the method
used in this paper only permits to estimate one shock. In particular, I will have
to look at Mountford & Uhlig (2009) or Blanchard & Perotti (2002) identification
schemes. Those will be subjects I would like to investigate during a PhD thesis.
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A Statistical properties of the series
Table 2: Test statistics for the KPSS test
lags Gt Ct Yt It
0 3.32 0.72 0.30 1.02
1 1.69 0.37 0.16 0.53
2 1.15 0.25 0.11 0.37
3 0.87 0.19 0.09 0.29
4 0.71 0.16 0.07 0.24
5 0.6 0.14 0.06 0.21
6 0.52 0.13 0.06 0.19
7 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.18
8 0.42 0.10 0.05 0.17
9 0.39 0.09 0.05 0.16
10 0.36 0.09 0.05 0.15
11 0.34 0.09 0.05 0.15
12 0.32 0.09 0.05 0.14
13 0.29 0.08 0.05 0.14
The null hypothesis for the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin
(KPSS) test is : the series is trend stationary. The 5% critical value
of the test is equal to 0.146. If the test statistic is greater than this
value, then we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% treshold.
Table 3: P-values for the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests
Phillips-Perron Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Gt 0.0674 0.0265
Ct 0.1832 0.0021
Yt 0.0250 0.0032
It 0.0585 0.0380
For the two tests, the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root
in the data. Both models have been estimated with a deterministic
trend.
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B Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2: Responses to an increase in government spending. SVAR in levels
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Figure 3: Responses to an increase in government spending. SVAR in levels
with linear trend
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Figure 4: Responses to an increase in government spending. SVAR in first
differences
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Table 4: Estimation results2 : FAVAR
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Equation 5 : GDP Deflator
L.factor1 -0.001∗
(0.001)
L2.factor1 0.000
(0.000)
L.factor2 -0.001∗
(0.000)
L2.factor2 0.000
(0.000)
Equation 6 : Treasury Bill
L.factor1 -0.628∗∗
(0.130)
L2.factor1 0.288∗
(0.127)
L.factor2 0.022
(0.127)
L2.factor2 0.015
(0.124)
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Figure 5: Responses to an increase in government spending. Factor-Augmented
VAR
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1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 6: Effects of government spending shock on consumption : VAR in levels
with linear trend
1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 7: Effects of government spending shock on investment : VAR in levels
with linear trend
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1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 8: Effects of government spending shock on consumption : VAR in
differences
1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 9: Effects of government spending shock on investment : VAR in differ-
ences
1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 10: Effects of government spending shock on GDP : FAVAR specification
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1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 11: Effects of government spending shock on consumption : FAVAR
specification
1960Q1:1979Q1 sample 1979Q1:2007Q1 sample
Figure 12: Effects of government spending shock on investment : FAVAR spec-
ification
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